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INTRODUCTION
Once the province of horror films and fantasy, the idea of recreating
extinct life forms is poised to move from science fiction to laboratories
and from there to the world at large. While “de-extinction is not
something that will take place tomorrow . . . scientists are making major
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advancements, and eventual success appears inevitable.”1 Spurred on by
the burgeoning field of genetic engineering, it was only a matter of time
before scientists turned their attention to recreating extinct life forms,
either for the thrill of it or in atonement for the human role in the
extinction process.
But science appears to be outpacing the ability of government agencies
to respond to the legal, moral, and practical questions that these
endeavors raise. Existing laws, like the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”),2 are inadequate to respond to the environmental and public
welfare risks these ventures pose. At the same time, the overlapping and
conflicting policies governing genetic engineering, upon which deextinction depends, have created a dysfunctional regulatory commons in
which no single agency is responsible for creating, implementing, and
enforcing applicable rules. Changes to this situation, even if politically
possible, will be too slow to respond to the intentional or unintentional
release of resurrected species into the environment. Thus, the existing
regulatory gap will enable de-extinction activities to continue
unrestrained, and there is little hope of government action closing this
gap any time soon.
This article proposes that participants in the field of de-extinction
undertake traditional governmental functions, including setting,
implementing, and enforcing performance standards,3 until external
regulations are developed.4 However, self-regulation or private
governance may not arise on its own. Therefore, this article suggests that
pressure from the application of social norms, like those pertaining to the
environment and human health, and a motivated, educated public might
encourage participants in the field of de-extinction to self-regulate. While
using social norms to encourage behavioral change is not new,5 the
Erin Okuno, Frankenstein’s Monster: Anticipating the Global Legal Framework for Deextinction, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 581, 590 (2016); see also C. Josh Donlan, De-Extinction in a Crisis
Discipline, 6 FRONTIERS OF BIOGEOGRAPHY 25, 25-26 (2014) (arguing that de-extinction “is likely
to become commonplace—sooner rather than later” due to “the rate of technological innovation,
which is currently doubling every decade and accelerating,” finding many of the criticisms of deextinction unwarranted, and observing that the challenges to succeeding are “substantial,”
particularly that of “moving from a few individuals to a functioning, viable population.”).
2 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (1973).
3 Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 14647 (2013) (defining private environmental governance as private actions “that are designed to
achieve traditionally governmental ends such as managing the exploitation of common pool
resources, increasing the provision of public goods, reducing environmental externalities, or more
justly distributing environmental amenities.”).
4 Id. at 186 (“Private governance could fill gaps where public governance cannot reach because
of political, territorial, or expertise gaps.”).
5 See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Why Norm Change Is a Better Solution to the Failed International
Regulatory Regime to Protect Whales than a Trading Program in Whale Shares, 32 STAN. ENVTL.
1
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linkage between norms and private governance to fill a regulatory gap
that encompasses an entire field—de-extinction—is novel.
In support of this somewhat unique proposition, this article first
introduces the reader to the phenomenon of de-extinction and the risks
posed by the process of creating and reintroducing formerly extinct
species to the environment. Unlike genetic engineering, which offers both
potential benefits and risks to humans and the environment, de-extinction
appears to offer mainly risks, slightly offset by economic benefits for a
few. In Part II, the discussion turns to the existing regulatory
framework—principally the ESA and policies governing genetic
engineering—that might be applied to de-extinct species and the process
of de-extinction. This Part concludes that the ESA would have to be
substantially amended to cover de-extinction—likely a futile proposition
in this period of anti-regulation. Even in the absence of anti-regulatory
politics, interests that stand to benefit from an unregulated field’s
development often exert almost unstoppable pressure to prevent
regulation. Thus, government action is unlikely to end the dysfunction of
the regulatory commons governing genetic engineering.6
Private governance initiatives might correct this situation. However,
such initiatives require incentives to encourage self-regulation and the
right circumstances to emerge and take hold. Here, where traditional
market incentives are nonexistent because there will be few customers for
de-extinct species, the norms of environmental protection and personal
responsibility might help encourage self-governing measures in the niche
community of de-extinction scientists. Accordingly, Part III discusses
both the phenomenon of private governance and the potential use of
social norms to drive the scientific community to self-regulate to avoid
the potentially harmful activities associated with de-extinction. The
article then concludes that private governance aided by social norms
might provide a transition from no control to some control. However, an
informed, active public is a necessary predicate to the successful
deployment of social norms. This may require the use of Cass Sunstein’s
norm entrepreneurs7—environmental, public health, and religious

L.J. 3 (2013); Hope M. Babcock, Corporate Environmental Social Responsibility: Corporate
“Greenwashing” or a Corporate Culture Game Changer? Symposium, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J.
1 (2010); Hope M. Babcock, Responsible Environmental Behavior, Energy Conservation, and
Compact Fluorescent Bulbs: You Can Lead a Horse to Water, But Can You Make It Drink?, 37
HOFSTRA L. J. 943 (2009); Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the
Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117 (2009).
6 See generally William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003).
7 Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996).
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activists, for example—who can publicize useful and trusted information
about these harms.8
This article assumes that de-extinction will eventually succeed,
making this paper more than an academic exercise in the fanciful.9 Its
contribution is to identify de-extinction as occurring in a regulatory gap,
the product of a dysfunctional regulatory commons, which norm-assisted
private governance might temporarily fill to prevent environmental and
public health harms from occurring. While this article builds off the work
of others,10 it is distinguished by its unique focus on private governance
and social norms to fill the de-extinction regulatory gap.
I. DE-EXTINCTION
Human activities have had an overwhelming effect on
global ecology that continues to increase in scope and
intensity, so much so that it is evident to at least some
eminent scientists that “we live on a human-dominated
planet.”11
A.

What is De-Extinction?

Human activities have had an overwhelming effect on global ecology.
Nowhere is this effect felt more keenly than in the extinction of species
over the past several hundred years.12 Humans are a primary contributor
to this phenomenon by over-exploiting certain species, destroying their
habitat, and introducing invasive species which prey on them or outcompete them for food and space.13 Beyond the “negative moral
implications” of extinction, extinction has “drastic ecological
consequences.”14 For example, the extinction of one species affects the
population size of remaining species, contributes to the co-extinction of
these species, and disrupts basic ecosystem functions.15
See generally Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 5.
Okuno, supra note 1, at 634 (“The future of de-extinction may be unclear, but one thing is
certain—acting too early is better than acting too late.”).
10 See, e.g., id. at 581; Alejandro E. Camacho, Going the Way of the Dodo: De-Extinction,
Dualisms, and Reframing Conservation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 849 (2015); Norman F. Carlin, Ilan
Wurman, & Tamara Zakim, How to Permit Your Mammoth: Some Legal Implications of “DeExtinction”, 33 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 3 (2014); see also Brooke Elizabeth Hrouda, “Playing God?”
An Examination of the Legality of CRISPR Germline Editing Technology Under the Current
International Regulatory Scheme and the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and
Human Rights, 45 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 221 (2016).
11 Camacho, supra note 10, at 896.
12 Okuno, supra note 1, at 585.
13 Camacho, supra note 10, at 896.
14 Okuno, supra note 1, at 585.
15 Camacho, supra note 10, at 859.
8
9
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As commonly understood, extinction occurs when a species “has died
out completely.”16 Functionally, the concept of extinction is more
complicated. Hence, under the ESA, a species that can be found in zoos
may be considered extinct “only in the wild or only in a certain
geographical area.”17 There is no separate legal definition of extinction in
the ESA, even though preventing extinction is a goal of the statute.18
Declaring a species extinct has serious implications under the ESA
because once declared extinct, the members of that species are no longer
entitled to the statute’s protection.19 Thus, while extinction is a
“probabilistic determination,” the timing of such a declaration is
important.20 Declaring a species extinct prematurely may perversely
contribute to that species’ complete extinction because interest in
protecting the species may wane.21
Extinctions are common. There have been five mass extinctions, “at
which times the Earth is estimated to have lost over 75 percent of its
species.”22 Putting aside the human contribution to extinction, one might
argue that resurrecting extinct species interferes with a natural process.
Such an argument is akin to the one made by those who find the process
of curing genetic diseases “unnatural” because, by looking at the vast
span of human history, “it is normal for the human population to be
reduced by epidemics.”23
De-extinction, then, is “the process of resurrecting species that have
died out, or gone extinct.”24 This can be done by selective breeding, also
Okuno, supra note 1, at 586.
Id. at 588 (confounding the finding of extinction is the existence of species, called “Lazarus
species,” once considered extinct, which are then found to be alive).
18 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (“The terms ‘conserve’, ‘conserving’, and ‘conservation’
means to use and the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any
endangered of threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this
chapter are no longer necessary.”).
19 Okuno, supra note 1, at 586-87 (“Determining that a species is extinct has serious legal
consequences because the ESA does not protect extinct species.”).
20 Id. at 587.
21 Id. at 587-88 (“The IUCN maintains the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species (Red
List) . . . .Among other things, the Red List categorizes the status of species (including identifying
species that are at risk of going extinct), and a species may be declared extinct on the Red List.”
According to the Species Survival Commission, “[a] taxon is [e]xtinct when there is no reasonable
doubt that the last individual has died. A taxon is presumed [e]xtinct when exhaustive surveys in
known and/or expected habitat, at appropriate times . . . , throughout its historic range have failed
to record an individual.”).
22 Id. at 585.
23 Rebecca Rodriguez, Note, Beyond Frankenstein’s Monster: Human Germline Editing and
the Implications of Waiting to Regulate, 38 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 585, 615 (2018).
24 Okuno, supra note 1, at 588 (quoting Kara Rogers, De-Extinction, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA (last updated Dec. 5, 2018), available at https://www.britannica.com/science/deextinction).
16
17
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referred to as “functional de-extinction,” or by genetically engineering
new species and releasing them into the environment.25 Functional deextinction involves “selectively breeding organisms exhibiting the
phenotypic or functional characteristics of extinct target organisms with
the intent of aggregating those desired characteristics into individual
organisms over several generations.”26 Genetic engineering, if used to
accomplish de-extinction, will employ a “suite of technologies” in which
the “DNA segments from extinct and extant species are combined to
make a new “recombinant” DNA.27 There are a number of de-extinction
projects under way, such as those to revive the passenger pigeon, the
Woolly Mammoth, and the gastric brooding frog.28
B. Methods That Can Be Used to Bring an Extinct Species Back to Life
There are three ways to resurrect an extinct species: cloning, genetic
engineering, and selective back-breeding or strategic mating. The latter
two are touched on above.29 “Cloning involves inserting a nucleus from
the extinct animal’s cells into a host animal’s unfertilized egg cell and
then implanting the cell into a surrogate.” 30 This process is also described
as a “somatic cell nuclear transfer” (“SCNT”).31 In genetic engineering,
scientists fill “gaps in the incomplete genetic sequence of an extinct
species using DNA fragments from a closely related living species.”32
Alternatively, in “selective back-breeding or strategic mating, scientists
identify certain traits and selectively breed close living relatives of an
extinct species until the living specimens begin to resemble the extinct
species.” 33 A combination of these methods may be used in the revival of
some extinct species.34
While scientists have modified genes for a very long time, they have
done so principally through selective back-breeding.35 The purposeful
manipulation of genes to create genetically-modified organisms is much
newer. Both approaches have resulted in “plant and animal varieties that
Camacho, supra note 10, at 852.
Id. at 852 n.12 (suggesting that it might be possible to recapture some of the characteristics
and functions of the extinct auroch, but the resulting animal would not be an auroch, only the
“ecological functional approximation” of one).
27 Id. at 853.
28 Id. at 854.
29 Okuno, supra note 1, at 592.
30 Id.
31 Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 7-8.
32 Okuno, supra note 1, at 592.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Rekha K. Rao, Note, Mutating Nemo: Assessing the Environmental Risks and Proposing the
Regulation of the Transgenic GlofishTM, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 903, 906 (2005).
25
26

176

Virginia Environmental Law Journal

[Vol. 37:3

do not formally exist in nature.”36 As a general rule, the more recent the
extinction, the greater the chance it might be resurrected.37 It also may be
easier to resurrect a species through genetic engineering if that species
has close living relatives or has “simpler genomic sequences, . . . as
invertebrates [do].”38 However, regardless of the procedure used, no
currently available technique can “create living specimens that are
genetically identical to the extinct species,” although such organisms
“could be close” to their extinct ancestors.39
Using genetic engineering to create a de-extinct species involves gene
splicing, a process through which the genome of a related species is
“modified to incorporate sequences from the extinct species.”40 “By
selecting specific genes that code for traits that distinguish the two
species, and inserting those genes from the extinct species into the living
relative,” the hope is that “the resulting hybrids would come to resemble
the extinct form.”41 Professor Alejandro Camacho describes what might
be involved in creating a viable Dodo: namely, “inserting preserved
fragments of Dodo genomic DNA into its closest living relative, an
existing, complete Nicobar pigeon (Caloenas nicobarica) genome. The
result would be a genomic hybrid Dodo/Nicobar pigeon.” 42 After
multiple generations of engaging in this effort, “DNA from extinct target
species would make up increasing proportions of genomes of de-extinct
individuals—eventually resulting in the genomes of de-extinct species
being derived entirely, and with high fidelity, from the genomes of their
extinct relatives.”43 This has not occurred yet, however.
The most “noteworthy” way to modify genes is through the use of
CRISPR-Cas 9 technology, which can modify DNA in the nuclei of
reproductive cells.44 “The change is achieved by going in while the cells
are still dividing to remove a portion of the DNA sequence and replace it
with another, different, pre-selected, and pre-created sequence”45—
Id.
Okuno, supra note 1, at 592.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 11-12; see also Hrouda, supra note 10, at 225
(“Biotechnology often uses genetic engineering, a method of creating new life forms and organic
material by gene-splicing and other techniques, as one of its main processes.”).
41 Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 11.
42 Camacho, supra note 10, at 853.
43 Id.
44 Hrouda, supra note 10, at 222, 225-26 (CRISPR is short for “clustered regularly interspersed
short palindrome repeats.”).
45 Id. at 225-26; see also id. at 223 (CRISPR-CAS-9 will facilitate “easier and more efficient
gene modification than previous technologies, which tend to be time consuming, expensive, and
sometimes dangerous.”); Rodriguez, supra note 23, at 594 (“CRISPR-Cas9 has brought cost, speed,
accuracy, and efficiency improvements to genome editing.”).
36
37
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somewhat analogous to “using the find and replace function of a
computer program.”46 Since scientists using CRISPR-Cas 9 technology
can modify fertilized embryos both in vivo and in vitro, the alteration in
the genetic makeup of the embryo will be permanent and will be passed
onto the parents’ offspring.47 This alteration is called germline editing,
and it is controversial because of the possibility that errors in the editing
process may permanently alter the species’ genetic makeup.48 Despite the
complexity of the CRISPR process, almost anyone can engage in
changing a species’ genes at a more basic level. For example, there are
reasonably priced, publicly available do-it-yourself kits to conduct
genetic experiments at home, which allow for inserting “jellyfish DNA
into yeast to make it fluoresce.”49
No de-extinct species have been genetically engineered yet through
CRISPR or any other technology. Selective or back-breeding has had
some success, resulting in the creation of animals that resemble extinct
species of zebra and wild cattle, among others.50 Cloning, on the other
hand, can “only succeed, if at all, in those few cases for which the
necessary raw material is available.”51 Unless the extinction was fairly
recent, this method is unlikely to succeed. Regardless of the methodology
used to resurrect an extinct species, none of them would be an “exact
copy” of the original extinct species.52 At most, they would “to some
degree” be “facsimiles or likenesses of the original species”53—not “an
extinct species truly brought back from the dead.”54
1.

Costs and risks of de-extinction

Before de-extinct species are released into the environment, a
sufficiently large quantity of individuals must be created in a laboratory
to enable their offspring to be introduced into the wild. 55 Then, the species
Rodriguez, supra note 23, at 594.
Hrouda, supra note 10, at 226.
48 Somatic gene editing affects only the individuals who receive the treatment and, therefore,
does not make permanent changes to the gene pool and does not create “a permanent genetic trait
in the future bloodlines.” See id. at 232 (discussing germline genetic editing); see also Rodriguez,
supra note 23, at 591.
49 Rodriguez, supra note 23, at 596.
50 Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 8; see also id. at 8-15 (describing each of these
approaches in detail).
51 Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 8.
52 Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted).
53 Id. (emphasis omitted).
54 Id.; see also Rodriguez, supra note 23, at 588-89 (including among the benefits of CRISPRCas9, a recent and hugely popular method of gene editing, bringing back to life once extinct
animals, “outside a movie theater.”).
55 Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 17.
46
47
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must actually be released into the environment. Both phases generate
costs and create risks.
a.

Costs

There are some obvious costs associated with recreating an extinct
species and managing and monitoring its release into the wild. For
example, the process of using wildlife captive breeding and release as a
surrogate for the extinct species is expensive.56 The monitoring and
adaptive management of captive-reared species can be extensive and last
for decades.57 The known costs associated with captive breeding will only
multiply in the case of the release of a newly resurrected species that has
never been a part of or has long been absent from the environment into
which it will be introduced.58 Any resurrected species may face the same
threats to its survival that led to its extinction in the first place: loss of
habitat or food supply, or diseases or predators against which it has no
defense. Any or all of these could require costly human intervention.
These expenditures may not be recaptured if the de-extinct species
does not survive, which is more than likely. The small population size of
the resurrected species would affect the species’ prospect of survival.59
Additionally, the small size of possible sub-populations of a de-extinct
species, the species’ concentration in relatively small geographic areas
during its early release years, and the uncertainty of how the species
would respond to its new environment would make it vulnerable to
predators and diseases.60 Unlike captive-bred species, a resurrected
species confined to a laboratory or some other kind of “breeding facility”
can hardly be said to have a “habitat or range” to which it is being
returned.61 If a de-extinct species, however, can be returned to its original
habitat, it may well face the same threats that led to its extinction in the
first place.62 Moreover, in the case of a species that has been extinct for a
substantial amount of time, it may have no natural habitat to which it can
return because its former one may have been lost as a result of human
activity or taken over by other species that “occup[y] the same ecological

56 Camacho, supra note 10, at 859 (“A number of scientists have identified the considerable
administrative expenditures from active reintroduction interventions for existing species.”).
57 Id.
58 See id.
59 Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 25.
60 Okuno, supra note 1, at 600.
61 Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 25.
62 Id. at 40.
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niche.”63 Its food supply may be gone, and it also may face predators,
diseases, and parasites that did not exist when it was alive. Additionally,
by the time a member of a de-extinct species is released, climate change
may have reduced the carrying capacity of its original habitat to a point
where the natural environment can no longer support that species.64 These
species may also face inadequate regulatory protection as it is unclear to
what extent the ESA or other wildlife laws might apply to them.65
De-extinction efforts also create potential opportunity costs, such as
the diversion of scarce resources from protecting endangered species and
existing ecological systems toward costly, undemonstrated, and
potentially harmful efforts to resuscitate extinct ones.66 Additionally, the
ability to resurrect an extinct species could “reduce the sense of urgency
for preventing extinctions, which has served as a rare effective catalyst
for regulatory efforts toward endangered species conservation.”67 It is
also possible that those who oppose species conservation efforts might
use the possibility of de-extinction to undermine laws requiring species
conservation.68 Thus, de-extinction, in general, might unintentionally
“erode” resources set aside for the preservation of endangered species or
protection of existing ecological resources.69
b.

Risks

The first set of risks involved in de-extinction has to do with the
creation of a formerly extinct species, especially if CRISPR-CAS9
techniques are used. CRISPR-Cas9 modifications have generated a “high
percentage of off-target mutations.”70 Because CRISPR technology
“requires precision cuts of very specific gene sequences,” accidentally
splicing the gene in incorrect places could cause “unintended
mutations.”71 Even if “the gene is spliced in the correct location, the
63 Id. at 26; see also id. at 41-42 (“The regions they inhabit may be more vulnerable to disruption
now, as a result of human development, climate change, and the disappearance of habitat and other
species, while their historic range may no longer contain habitat that is suitable for them.”).
64 Id. at 42.
65 See id. at 25; see also infra Part II.A. (discussing the poor fit of the ESA to de-extinct species).
66 Camacho, supra note 10, at 861.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.; see also Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 6-7 (“Some are concerned that the
ability to revive dead species may undercut conservation efforts for still-living species that are
endangered or threatened, detracting from the perceived need to protect them if they are reliably
replaceable and eroding society’s understanding of what constitutes “nature.” Moreover, “concerns
also exist about the impact of novel organisms on the integrity of existing ecosystems.”).
70 Rodriguez, supra note 23, at 615; see also id. (“While these initial studies seem concerning,
no new biomedical technology is 100% safe and reliable.”).
71 Hrouda, supra note 10, at 240.
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newly inserted sequence may still bind to different locations upon
insertion.”72 If the genetic engineering process involves germline gene
modifications,73 the genetic changes will be passed to the species’
offspring, which will then carry the gene as a portion of their genetic
makeup upon birth,74 making the change permanent, for better or for
worse.
The next set of risks arise when an animal is introduced into a new
environment. In the case of a de-extinct species, the usual risks of
introduction are magnified by the limited ability to anticipate and then
mitigate harms that might occur.75 Resurrected species are not
“recreations of species that were reasonably well known to nineteenthcentury science, but something that never before existed.”76 Even
observations about them from their time in a breeding facility or
laboratory would imperfectly predict their behavior in the wild.77
Consequently, almost nothing is known about how a de-extinct species
will adapt, conduct itself in the wild, and coexist with the life it finds
there.78 This will be particularly true the further away from extinction the
introduction occurs.79 Moreover, climate change will exacerbate these
uncertainties by making it even more difficult to assess and manage any
introduction of de-extinct species due to the fluidity of the natural
environment’s response to that phenomenon.80
“The artificiality and novelty of de-extinction” amplifies concerns
about “unlikely but potentially catastrophic outcomes.” 81 For example, a
resurrected species might bring with it unexpected diseases and parasites
and thus act as a “vector” for the inter-species spread of these

Id.
See id. at 227 (“Human germline modification can be separated into two distinct processes,
germline treatment, also known as germline transfer, and germline enhancement. Germline
treatment or transfer is considered negative genetic engineering and aims to prevent or treat disease.
On the other side of the spectrum is germline enhancement or positive genetic engineering, which
aims to enhance a particular capability or trait.”).
74 Id. at 225 (“In a germline gene transfer, the germinal cells of the subject’s parents’ egg and
sperm cells are targeted prior to implantation and genetically modified with the goal of passing on
the changes to the offspring, who will then carry the gene as a portion of its genetic makeup upon
birth.”); see also Rao, supra note 35, at 908 (“The process of genetic modification occurs by
identifying one gene carrying a particular characteristic in an organism, and transferring that same
characteristic by inserting the gene from one organism into another.”).
75 Camacho, supra note 10, at 860.
76 Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 42.
77 Id.
78 Camacho, supra note 10, at 861; see also Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 25.
79 Camacho, supra note 10, at 861; see also Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 25.
80 Camacho, supra note 10, at 860.
81 Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 42.
72
73
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contagions.82 De-extinct species may kill prey, thus generating
unexpected impacts on existing predators and upsetting the food chain.83
Even though de-extinct species may be put back into their historic ranges,
if they have been gone for a long time, it is unlikely that the ecosystem
that greets them will be the same, as other species may have occupied
their ecological niche.84 If resurrected species are superior with respect to
catching prey and reproducing, they may “outcompete or displace the
species that replaced them, or cause habitat destruction or disrupt food
chains in ecosystems established since their time.”85 Similar to crosspollination between genetically modified and unaltered crops,
“unintended cross-breeding may occur between genetically modified
facsimiles and the species from which they were derived, potentially
further spreading their altered traits”86 and thus permanently changing the
native population. There is a risk that reintroduced species could also
adversely affect the human environment by threatening livestock and
commercial fisheries, agriculture and recreational land uses, and even
human safety.87
According to Professor Alejandro Camacho, the history of natural
resources management contains numerous examples of the introduction
of non-native species to reduce or offset other human effects on
ecological resources; nonetheless, these initiatives led to extensive
unintended ecological harm to those resources.88 Some may even view
the introduction of a de-extinct species into a biotic community of which
it was never a part as reducing the quality of native biotic communities
and natural ecosystems—”akin to an invasive species that makes the
existing community ostensibly less authentic.”89 Any reintroduction of a
species, whether resurrected or existing elsewhere, risks “disrupting
receiving biological communities and, rather than increase biodiversity
or ecological function, may serve to decrease it.”90 Thus, rather than
contributing an ecological benefit to the receiving environment, these deextinct species may “erode biodiversity, disrupt ecosystems, and
Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 25.
84 Id. at 41.
85 Id. at 42-43.
86 Id.
87 Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 43.
88 Camacho, supra note 10, at 860 n.46 (citing as examples of this the introduction of the kudzu
vine in the southeast to control erosion and the cane toad in Australia to control the cane beetle).
89 Id.
90 Id.; see also Rao, supra note 35, at 913 (discussing GlofishTM and arguing that “the potential
environmental impacts of a transgenic fish’s exposure to the environment include: interbreeding
with wild species, hybridization with varieties of other fish, disturbance of habitat, or displacement
of the native fish as a consequence of competition for resources”).
82
83
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contribute to extinctions at receiving sites.”91 For example, if a genetically
modified de-extinct species outcompetes its unmodified ancestors, it
might cause the unaltered members of the species to go extinct and
completely displace the native population.92
2.

Benefits of de-extinction

Given all the risks and possible non-recoverable costs associated with
resurrecting extinct species, what would motivate anyone to engage in the
process? One reason often given is that it would be “thrilling” to resurrect
an extinct species. While Jurassic Park may be infeasible, a “somewhat
more plausible Pleistocene Park, populated with mammoths and aurochs,
would generate nearly as much popular excitement.”93 And then there is
the money to be made94 from the possible sale of de-extinct species or
from using them as exhibit animals.
De-extinction may also contribute to biodiversity conservation.95 For
example, if de-extinction produced a resurrected animal that functioned
as a keystone species, its reintroduction could revive an entire ecosystem,
creating “substantial environmental benefits.”96 De-extinction would also
give scientists an “unprecedented opportunity to study their research
subjects as living species.”97
De-extinction could also function “as a last resort conservation tool
(sort of like an insurance policy for endangered species).”98 It might be
used to help with the recovery of endangered species populations.99 For
example, what has been learned from cloning efforts for extinct species

Camacho, supra note 10, at 859.
Rao, supra note 35, at 914-15.
93 Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 5; see also Okuno, supra note 1, at 590 (“The
concept of de-extinction is intriguing and exciting.”).
94 Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 5. But see id. at 17 (“A final point that should be
emphasized is that the ultimate objective of de-extinction efforts is not to produce laboratory
curiosities, but to restore lost species to independent existence in nature. No de-extinction
proponent has yet admitted a desire to produce mammoths solely for zoos or Carolina parakeets
solely as pets. Rather, the aim of these efforts is to create, release, and reestablish self-sustaining
breeding populations in the wild.”).
95 Okuno, supra note 1, at 590.
96 Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 5. For a discussion of the controversy
surrounding the reintroduction of the gray wolf in the Northern Rocky Mountains, see generally
Hope M. Babcock, The Sad Story of the Northern Rocky Mountain Gray Wolf Reintroduction
Program, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 25 (2013) (noting that the wolf’s reintroduction into its
former habitat produced environmental benefits but also threatened economic harm).
97 Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 5.
98 Okuno, supra note 1, at 590.
99 Id.; see also Camacho, supra note 10, at 857 (“A number of proponents of de-extinction
contend that technologies developed in the pursuit of de-extinction may have considerable cobenefits for efforts to recover critically endangered populations.”).
91
92
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could be used to clone existing endangered species, particularly when
only a few or no reproducing individuals remain.100 Insights about genetic
manipulation gleaned from de-extinction experiments may be used “to
increase the genetic diversity of existing endangered species populations
or to engage in the ‘genetic rescue’ of endangered species that are
genetically depauperate.”101 De-extinction may teach scientists how to
insert new genes into the genome of at-risk species to improve their
fitness in the face of threats like “introduced pathogens or parasites.”102
Introducing de-extinct species, especially ones that could replace
extinct keystone species, might help ecosystems that have lost
“constituent species” to recover their integrity and functionality.103 As
with the reintroduction of existing endangered species, the “strategic
introduction of members of a revived species could provide benefits not
only for the introduced species but also other components of the
ecological community.”104 Thus, introducing a resurrected species into its
former habitat could be seen as “a form of (or at least analogous to)
rewilding or restoration ecology.”105
Some proponents of de-extinction “suggest” that successfully
resurrecting an extinct species would benefit ecological conservation by
providing a concrete example of the ability of humans “to shape and
repair past and ongoing anthropogenic damage to ecosystems.”106 This
might galvanize people to “try to develop solutions that cultivate
ecological health.”107 Using de-extinction as “an example of the capacity
for ecological manipulation” also might “combat resignation in some
quarters that humans are incapable of mending past and continuing harm
to ecological resources.”108
Some argue that “humans have a moral obligation to attempt to bring
back at least some of those species we ourselves exterminated,”109 making
the revival of species that humans caused to go extinct “a matter of
justice.”110 But others argue that the concept is “unnatural and
hubristic,”111and thus another instance of humanity’s lack of humility.112
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

Camacho, supra note 10, at 857.
Id. at 858.
Id.
Id. at 856-57.
Id.
Camacho, supra note 10, at 856-57.
Id. at 858.
Id.
Id.
Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 6.
Okuno, supra note 1, at 589.
Id.
Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 6.
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Carlin and his co-authors find the “specter of humans ‘playing God’ on
this scale—wiping out entire species that inconveniently inhabit some
desirable property, then bringing them back at will—is certainly
distressing.”113 On one hand, de-extinction is certainly disruptive of the
natural cycle, which includes extinction. Some opponents of deextinction also are concerned that “the process of producing a resurrected
animal is cruel or harmful to the animal itself”114 or might trigger “serious
ecological or human health problems.”115 On the other hand, proponents
of de-extinction “suggest that de-extinction may restore the ecological,
instrumental, and intrinsic value that was lost when a species went extinct
and that de-extinction might be used to help restore biodiversity and
increase ecosystems’ resilience.” 116 The debate over the costs and
benefits of de-extinction continues without a clear resolution.
As this Part has shown, the value of de-extinction is contested. Its risks
are unknown, and therefore difficult to quantify. Although the concept of
de-extinction might stimulate interest in conservation, “there are many
reasons to question whether de-extinction of species, such as the Dodo,
will be an effective tool for restoring or advancing ecological health.”117
Regardless of its contribution to conservation strategy, the current
problem is that de-extinction is critically under-regulated, as the next Part
shows.
II. THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND CURRENT REGULATORY GAP
[R]eliance on native/exotic and human/nature dichotomies
for invasive species and public lands law and management
conflicts with current scientific understanding, disregards
the pervasive effects of humans on natural systems, and
ultimately fails to foster the effective protection of
ecological resources and their services.118
Existing wildlife protection statutes, such as the ESA, do not envision
the existence of species that were once extinct, but are now resurrected.119
In fact, one of the primary purposes of the ESA is to prevent species from
Id. at 6-7.
Id.
115 Okuno, supra note 1, at 590 (noting “trepidations about animal welfare and potential
negative effects of introducing de-extinct species into the environment”).
116 Id.
117 Camacho, supra note 10, at 905.
118 Id. at 879.
119 There are other wildlife laws like the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, 39 Stat. 1702
(1916) and laws that protect wildlife habitat, like the Federal Land & Policy Management Act of
1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et. seq. These laws are not considered here because their protective
importance for wildlife is secondary to the ESA.
113
114

2019]

The Genie is Out of the De-Extinction Bottle

185

going extinct by protecting them from harms that might push them to the
brink.120 Consequently, the ESA offers no guidance on the process of deextinction or the protection of, or from, de-extinct species in the wild. The
ESA would have to be substantially amended to offer adequate
protection. But expanding the ESA’s protective reach is unlikely in this
era of de-regulation, which has had an especially strong impact on
wildlife laws.121 Nor do the statutes and regulations governing
biotechnology and genetic engineering, which play an important role in
the de-extinction process, offer much help. These sources of law are
scattered across various agencies and levels of government, embodying
the antithesis of a coherent regulatory program. The result is a
dysfunctional regulatory commons with respect to genetic engineering
and a regulatory gap that encompasses the entire field of de-extinction.
This Part describes this regulatory gap, the regulatory commons, and the
consequences of each for de-extinction.
A. A Regulatory Gap—Existing Domestic Wildlife Laws Do Not Cover
De-Extinct Species122
The ESA focuses on preserving “existing species in their historical and
existing habitat, while minimizing those resources deemed to be artificial
or artifactual.”123 Protecting de-extinct species would shift the focus of
the Act from protecting existing habitat to protecting a de-extinct species’

120 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (“The terms ‘conserve’, ‘conserving’, and ‘conservation’
mean to use and the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered
of threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no
longer necessary.”).
121 Since January 3, 2017, when the 115th Congress was sworn in, there have been 75 legislative
attempts to weaken the ESA, including legislation that would weaken the consultation, listing, and
consultation processes of the statute, strip current protections from specific species like gray, red,
and Mexican wolves and grizzly bears and prevent the listing of certain species like the greater sage
grouse. Center for Biological Diversity, Politics of Extinction, available at
https://www,biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/esa_attacks/trumptable.htlm (last visited Mar. 4,
2019).
122 This article does not discuss the possible applicability of international treaties, international
law in general, or patent law to de-extinct species, such as the Convention on Biological on
Biological Diversity or the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to that Convention, because “[i]n its
current form, the international legal framework likely will be ill suited to meet the challenges
associated with controlling and safeguarding de-extinct species.” Okuno, supra note 1, at 620; see
also id. at 584 (discussing a more inclusive list of such treaties, such as the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Convention on the
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, and the Patent Law Treaty).
123 Camacho, supra note 10, at 863.
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former habitat.124 Additionally, the emphasis in the ESA, and in other
laws like the Wilderness Act,125 on minimizing human involvement in
species recovery does not “map” easily onto the introduction of de-extinct
species, which is dependent on substantial human involvement.
Therefore, while this result is not surprising—de-extinction was not in
the minds of the drafters of these laws—the ESA and other similar laws
may impede the return of many resurrected species, even if
environmentally beneficial.126
A de-extinct species is only “a facsimile of an extinct species,” and,
therefore, “inherently artificial, the product of human manipulation in the
laboratory or breeding facility.”127 The purpose of the ESA, however, is
not “to provide protection for new organisms invented by human beings
ab initio”; applying the ESA in this way would certainly be “a novel
interpretation of the statute.”128 Moreover, theories of dynamic statutory
interpretation, which arise when new circumstances require the
adjustment of a statutory directive,129 offer little help. Any
accommodation to overcome these problems would be so contrary to the
law’s expected application that it would stretch its original meaning
beyond any recognizable interpretation.130
In all likelihood, laws that promote wilderness preservation and
emphasize the importance of natural processes over human involvement,
such as the Wilderness Act of 1964,131 would likely consider the
introduction of a de-extinct species “exotic” because humans are
responsible for its presence.132 As exotic species, de-extinct species would
be viewed as harmful, “their introduction prohibited, and their existence

124 Id. at 855 (noting that other wildlife laws might “perversely” allow re-introduction of a
resurrected species where it might be unsuited to current conditions, but not allow that to happen
where the reintroduction might provide substantial ecological benefits).
125 16 U.S.C. § 1311(c).
126 Camacho, supra note 10, at 864.
127 Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 22.
128 Id. at 31 (“The text and purpose of the ESA may be interpreted as qualifying resurrected
species for listing, even though they are facsimiles rather than true revivals of extinct species.”).
129 Id. (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 176
(1994)).
130 But see id. (“Fundamentally, the purpose of the ESA is to protect and restore species most
at risk. Recreating and reintroducing close facsimiles of extinct species seems not so very different
from rediscovering them, as happened with the Franciscan manzanita.”).
131 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36.
132 Camacho, supra note 10, at 880; see also id. at 885 (“Under such a definition of native or
exotic that hinges nativeness on the lack of human intervention, however, any de-extinct species
proposed to be introduced would almost certainly be considered exotic.”). According to Professor
Camacho, the “NPS in fact expressly states that genetically modified organisms exist solely due to
human activities and therefore are managed as exotic species in parks.” Id. (internal quotation
omitted).
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subject to a range of management strategies that seek to control or
eliminate their presence.”133 Being labelled exotic would mean these
species would not be protected by laws that promote native species.134
This may also result in their being labelled invasive, which would subject
them to control or possible eradication.135 The fact that many jurisdictions
do not protect exotic species may force the selection of introduction sites
for resurrected species to be based on where the species once existed,
even if the area’s conditions have changed substantially.136
Laws that focus on the “natural” environment and on “minimizing
human influences” result in species management regulations that “inhibit
or prohibit human-directed program[s].” Because humans play an
essential part in these species’ creation and eventual return to the wild,
these statutes thus are ill-suited to managing the reintroduction of deextinct species.137 This emphasis “on nativity” in domestic wildlife laws
has resulted in “legal categories such as ‘endangered,’ ‘native,’ and
‘exotic.”138 Professor Camacho believes that these categories are
“erroneously premised on ecological stasis and make little sense applied
to the management of de-extinct species.”139
Therefore, laws like the ESA offer little guidance on how to approach
de-extinct species. In fact, these statutes create barriers to their
introduction. Any amendment to those laws to reach de-extinct species
would have to be more substantial than adding a separate provision or a
few words to cover them, though even that small adjustment would be
difficult to achieve in the current anti-regulatory environment. Still,
because these statutes are incompatible with the world of de-extinction,
an entirely new statute regulating the process and effects of de-extinction
is probably necessary—a solution which is even less politically feasible.

Id. at 888.
Id. at 885; see also id. at 878 (“Generally, the predominant motivation of this strain of
wildlife law is to protect or promote native preexisting species, combined with seeking to keep
exotic species from ecologically significant areas.”).
135 Camacho, supra note 10, at 885; see also id. at 878 (“If considered invasive, however, an
organism generally also will be vulnerable to laws that seek to minimize, control, or eradicate its
species in that jurisdiction.”).
136 Id. at 889.
137 Id. at 892; see also id. (“As a result of these dichotomies, de-extinct species will often be
obstructed as non-native and/or introduced—even if they might promote ecological function in a
particular area—and may be allowed or promoted in locations they used to exist—even if likely to
cause ecological damage.”).
138 Id.
139 Id.; see also id. at 855 (“De-extinction illustrates the limitations of the law’s reliance on these
simplistic dichotomies”).
133
134
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B. A Regulatory Commons—Genetically Engineered Organisms
Since the start of this century, scientists have been discovering “new
technologies and processes in genomic engineering and gene
modification.”140 Most commonly, scientists have used genetic
engineering to create genetically modified (“GM”) crops that are more
resistant to diseases, pests, and pesticides. Like de-extinct species, “the
ecological impacts of GM crops are scientifically uncertain and difficult
to predict prior to release.”141 Although the field of GM crops is
significantly more established than de-extinction, it too remains largely
unregulated because a bewildering array of potentially applicable policies
and laws have created a regulatory void. De-extinct species probably
occupy the midpoint on the spectrum of concern between genetically
modified crops and genetically modified human beings.
1.

Existing Regulatory Bodies and Regimes

In 1986, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), the EPA,
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) developed the
Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology
(“Coordinated Framework”), apportioning responsibility for
biotechnology oversight among various federal agencies.142 The
Coordinated Framework contains policy statements from a number of
federal agencies, collectively suggesting that existing laws can
adequately regulate genetically engineered products.143 Indeed, the
Coordinated Framework reflects more than ten of these laws—all of
which were written for some purpose other than the regulation of
biotechnology.144 As a consequence, Professor Carlin comments, the

Hrouda, supra note 10, at 222.
Heather Hosmer, Outgrowing Agency Oversight: Genetically Modified Crops and the
Regulatory Commons Theory, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 647, 663-64 (2013).
142 Rao, supra note 35, at 910 (“In the 1986 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of
Biotechnology (Coordinated Framework), three federal agencies published the federal
government’s policy toward the regulation of biotechnology, allowing the FDA, the USDA, and
the EPA to use existing statutes to regulate different biotechnologies. Under the FDCA, the FDA
reviews food, food additives, human drugs, animal drugs, and biologics. Generally, the USDA’s
Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) has jurisdiction over food products prepared from domestic
livestock and poultry. In addition, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the USDA
regulates animal biologics, plants, seeds, plant pests, animal pathogens, and certain geneticallymodified organisms containing plant pest genetic material.”).
143 Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 45 (quoting Coordinated Framework for
Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 26, 1986)).
144 Id. at 46 (citing Rosie Mestel, Genetic Modification Strains Old Food and Drug Laws, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 23, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/23/science/la-sci-gmoregulations20130324). For example, some of the regulations referred to in the Framework “address issues such
as tainted drugs, wheat spiked with sawdust and pollution by industrial chemicals.” Id.
140
141
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results under the Coordinated Framework can be “odd.”145 The Obama
Administration’s 2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework did little to
change the regulatory structure imposed in the original version,
maintaining the assumption about the adequacy of existing laws. Instead,
it focused on “increasing [process] transparency, clarifying agency
authority, and reducing regulatory hurdles” to the use of genetically
engineered products.146 The operating assumptions in both versions
continues to be that “continued advances in biotechnology are desirable,
that genetic engineering processes are not inherently risky, and that it is
possible to manage risks presented by specific genetically-engineered
products using the same regulatory mechanisms that apply to
conventional products.”147
Under the Coordinated Framework, the FDA regulates transgenic
animals—animals containing genetic material into which DNA has been
artificially introduced into the germ line—under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”),148 and the EPA has authority “to regulate
all microorganisms produced for environmental, industrial, or consumer
uses,” under the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”).149 Moreover,
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) grants
the EPA power “to regulate genetically-engineered microorganisms
formed by deliberate combinations of genetic material from dissimilar
source organisms.”150
For the EPA to use its TSCA authority to regulate de-extinct species,
it must find that the resurrected species contains a “chemical substance,”
the manufacture, use, sale or disposal of which poses “an unreasonable
risk of injury to health or the environment.”151 Chemical substances are
defined in the TSCA as “any organic or inorganic substance of a
particular molecular identity including – i) any combination of such
substances occurring in whole or in part as a result of chemical reaction

Id.
Jonas J. Monast, Editing Nature: Reconceptualizing Biotechnology Governance, 59 B.C. L.
REV. 2377, 2389 (2018).
147 Id. at 2415.
148 Rao, supra note 35, at 919; see 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2000).
149 Rao, supra note 35, at 910. See also 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2000) (giving EPA authority
to track and monitor chemicals as well as to ban any that pose an unreasonable risk of harm to
human health or the environment).
150 Rao, supra note 35, at 910-11. TSCA’s exclusion of “any food, food additive, drug, [or]
cosmetic . . . when manufactured, processed, or distributed in commerce for use as a food, food
additive, drug, cosmetic, or device” from the definition of a “chemical substance” has no relevance
for resurrected animals because it is highly unlikely that they would end up as food or a food
additive. Id. at 922 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2602(B)(vi)).
151 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2). The more limited scope of FIFRA makes its application to de-extinct
species highly unlikely.
145
146
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or occurring in nature and any ii) element or uncombined radical.”152 The
risk of ecological and human harm posed by the release of resurrected
species might be sufficient to regulate them under the TSCA, as long as
the chemical substances definitional barrier can be overcome.
The EPA’s original position on “whether transgenic animals constitute
chemical substances” was that “chemical substances do not ‘exclude life
forms which may be manufactured for commercial purposes’” and that
“TSCA regards generally recombinant DNA molecules as ‘chemical
substances . . . .”‘153 But it remains uncertain whether “a host organism,”
like a de-extinct species that contains “recombined DNA molecules[,]
fits . . . that definition.”154
Although the USDA has said that it would use its existing policies to
regulate genetically engineered animals,155 it has made no move to assert
this jurisdiction. Perhaps driving this hesitancy is a belief that given the
agency’s focus on meat products consumed by humans, it would be a
stretch for the agency to regulate de-extinct animals that would not be
eaten by anyone.156 The FDCA and Public Health Safety Act impose some
requirements on the development of gene therapies, to the extent that they
must be “subject to clinical trials for Investigational New Drugs.” 157 None
of these laws, however, offers a secure hook for regulating de-extinct
species.158
This Part shows that the Coordinated Framework consists of little more
than the under-developed, changing policy positions of multiple federal
agencies with unclear regulatory boundaries. The Coordinated
Framework “relies on a fragmented and inefficient regulatory
patchwork”159 to regulate biotechnology and genetic engineering.
Moreover, if the Coordinated Framework’s statements about various
agencies’ regulatory authority over resurrected species are not consistent
with each agency’s statutory authority, those statements would be
152 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(A); see also Rao, supra note 35, at 922 (“For the EPA to regulate
GloFishTM, it must find that GloFishTM consist of chemicals comprised of a particular molecular
composition resulting from a chemical reaction.”)).
153 Rao, supra note 35, at 922.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 920.
156 Id.
157 Hrouda, supra note 10, at 230. A less relevant agency with respect to the regulation of
resurrected animal species is the Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM), which “has primary
jurisdiction over ‘modifications that affect the performance of the animal or attributes of the
products derived from the animal through the action of the expression product of an inserted gene,’
and ‘animals modified to produce drugs, biologics, or other substances of commercial value.’” Rao,
supra note 35, at 919.
158 Hrouda, supra note 10, at 230.
159 Camacho, supra note 10, at 901.
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unenforceable because they would be beyond the agency’s delegated
authority. Some critics argue that the Coordinated Framework’s
“regulatory regime has resulted in regulatory passivity as agencies have
equated providing similar treatment for conventional and
biotechnological products with limited regulation.” These critics would
like to see “a more precautionary regulatory approach,”160 but this seems
unlikely given the strength of the biotechnology industry discussed in the
next subsection. It is also worth noting that the Coordinated Framework
does not incorporate any adaptive management measures, which, if
applied, would consider initial assessments to be only provisional and
require periodic evaluations of and revisions to decisions to stimulate
agency learning over time.161 Nor do any of the laws encompassed in it
impose any ethical requirements on activities taken under their authority.
2.

Potential for Regulation Under Patent Law

A less likely, but nonetheless noteworthy, source of potential
regulation of de-extinct species is patent law. Applying patent law to deextinct species rests on the theory that a de-extinct species is “novel,
useful, and non-obvious.”162 “Whether living organisms are patentable
varies from country to country and is an unsettled issue even within many
countries,” as is the question of whether these laws apply nationally or
regionally.163 Even if one could patent a de-extinct species, however, that
species would only be protected as intellectual property.164 While this
might be commercially beneficial from the perspective of individuals
involved in the de-extinction process who hold a patent, it would offer
limited protection or benefit to either the de-extinct species itself or to the
public as a whole.165
Somewhat surprisingly, no current law directly regulates the genetic
modification of human embryos.166 Nor are there regulations that apply
to germline modifications, the most controversial use of CRISPR

160 Id. at 902; see also Okuno, supra note 1, at 626 (“The precautionary approach or its
underlying concepts should be applied to the protection of de-extinct species and to the protection
of biodiversity and the environment from de-extinct species.”).
161 Camacho, supra note 10, at 902.
162 Okuno, supra note 1, at 619.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 621.
165 Id.
166 Hrouda, supra note 10, at 229-30 (“Presently in the United States, there is huge diversity in
state regulations, and it is not clear whether any federal law or federal regulations directly address
the genetic modification, particularly germline enhancements, of embryos. Most likely the
uncertainty is because until recently the technology was only speculative.”).
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technology.167 Despite the lack of regulations, “[t]he FDA approved a
gene therapy for the first time in August 2017,”168 and gene therapy
research useful to humans is moving forward quickly because of its
perceived benefits. In that same month, a group of scientists announced
“the successful editing of a human embryos [sic] to address a genetic
blood disorder—the first successful human germline editing involving
U.S. scientists.”169 A month later, an FDA advisory committee proposed
authorizing a second gene therapy.170 Although the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) prohibits the use of federal funds for human germline
modifications, private funding is enabling the use of CRISPR technology
for non-inheritable treatments.171 For example, the first authorized
clinical trial of a CRISPR gene therapy in humans was privately
funded.172
This discussion should make clear that there are no generally
applicable federal environmental laws that would apply to species that
have been resurrected through the use of genetic engineering
technology.173 It is possible that under the Coordinated Framework these
species might be “subject to a range of laws and regulations that apply
generally to ‘GMOs’ [genetically modified organisms] without
specifying particular uses (such as food, pesticides, etc.).”174 While some
of these regulations might apply to the de-extinction process or to the
release of de-extinct species into the wild,175 definitional hurdles may
have to be overcome, like those under TSCA. Additionally, some state or
local anti-GMO ordinances might prohibit de-extinction experiments.176
It remains to be seen whether the policies under the Coordinated
Framework might preempt those laws and allow these experiments to
move forward. Certainly, nothing in the ESA would. The unregulated
landscape in which genetic engineering technologies are being developed
has resulted in growing ethical, political, and legal concerns, especially
167 Id. at 229 (“Unfortunately, U.S. law on germline modification technologies is relatively nonexistent, and what does exist is questionable as to whether CRISPR technology specifically fits
underneath its umbrella.”).
168 Monast, supra note 146, at 2425.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Carlin, Wurman & Zakim, supra note 10, at 46 (“The web of regulations used to govern
genetically engineered species draws on more than 10 laws, all written for other purposes.”).
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.; see also Rao, supra note 35, at 912 (“Although the federal government has yet to regulate
the release of transgenic fish into the food supply and for ornamental use, one state has acted to
control its release. California has banned the production of transgenic salmon, exotic (non-native),
and transgenic fish in state waters.”).

2019]

The Genie is Out of the De-Extinction Bottle

193

with regard to human subjects.177 Many of these concerns transfer to the
application of such methods to the resurrection of extinct species.
C. The Effect of a Regulatory Commons in the Field of Genetic
Engineering
The preceding discussion of the Coordinated Framework illustrates
how the field of genetic engineering, which plays a key role in the deextinction process, functions as a regulatory commons. The resultant
“splintered agency jurisdiction and political disincentives for regulatory
expansion,” characteristic of a regulatory commons, not only lead to
“under regulation,” but can also result in no regulation at all.178 Powerful
opponents of regulation, operating in a vacuum created by a regulatory
commons, can prevent nascent regulation from arising, aided by the costs
of trying to coordinate across agency jurisdictions.179 The failure to
clearly allocate regulatory authority creates problems for policymakers
and the public when it comes to identifying and improving agency
deficiencies.180 Additionally, the existence of a regulatory commons
steers states away from attempting to regulate.181 The Coordinated
Framework, even though it is ineffective, might block states from
regulating the use of genetic engineering in the production of de-extinct
species if that activity falls within the purview of one of the laws included
in the Coordinated Framework.
In the absence of control by a single agency or a designated agency
leader, there is an increased likelihood of “overlapping and mismatched
regulatory jurisdictions that will create oversight gaps.”182 As reflected in
the Coordinated Framework, “fragmented regulatory oversight” without
a designated lead agency makes it difficult for individuals seeking change
in how the government manages an issue to identify the agency in charge

Hrouda, supra note 10, at 222.
Hosmer, supra note 141, at 651.
179 Id. at 668. The strength of the biotech industry is illustrated by Recombinetics, Inc., a firm
seeking to market genetically bred hornless cows. The company argues that gene editing is no
different than selective breeding as it simply speeds up the selective breeding process farmers have
used for thousands of years and, thus is not only harmless, but should also be perfectly legal since
“new techniques that achieve the same result should be legal as well,” and thus avoid any type of
stringent legal review. Monast, supra note 146, at 2399. However, there are important differences
between CRISPR and selective breeding. For example, the latter takes time and allows ecosystems
and systems of governance to adjust; whereas CRISPR speeds up that process to the point where it
outpaces traditional regulatory responses. In addition, gene editing may produce different results
than conventional breeding. Id. at 2400.
180 Hosmer, supra note 141, at 668.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 649.
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of that issue, let alone assign blame or influence that agency.183 Thus,
regulatory commons theory predicts that
[w]here numerous regulators could be blamed for the ill, or
sought out for relief, demanders of regulation encounter
substantial informational and strategic hurdles confounding
attribution decisions. If no single regulator is perceived as the
institution most responsible for a problem or its correction, no
particular regulator will likely be blamed for governmental
inattention.184

Simultaneously, “the political disincentives of being blamed for
current problems, transaction costs of working with other agencies, and
free rider problems dissuade agencies from expanding their authority and
taking the lead on GM regulations.”185 Regulatory commons theory also
“cautions” that collective action problems make it “difficult” to garner
support for corrective legislation.186
Regulatory commons theory also predicts that fragmented oversight
creates “beneficiaries of the status quo,” i.e., those who profit from weak
oversight and who “have a vested interest in maintaining a low level of
regulation.”187 The biotechnology industry is a multi-billion dollar per
year industry responsible for creating thousands of job.188 It can afford the
high cost of influencing fragmented agencies as well as the expense of
conducting the scientific research needed to inform agency decisions. As
a result, this industry has become a powerful force supporting limited
regulation of the field.189 The sheer size of the industry has made state and
federal policymakers “hesitant to increase regulation” of it.190
Additionally, federal agencies are dependent on biotech industries for
the technical data they need to support their decisions in the field.191
Often, only members of the regulated industry have the necessary interest
and resources to influence agency decision making because they are
“better organized, better funded, more expert, and better informed.” 192

183 Id. (“Without a staunch public mandate, agencies fail to perceive and react to flaws in their
practices, which results in under regulation.”).
184 Id. at 664 (quoting William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 31 (2003)).
185 Id. at 649.
186 Hosmer, supra note 141, at 668.
187 Id. at 665.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 650.
190 Id. at 665.
191 Id.; see also id. (“Thus, agencies overseeing GMOs have become increasingly dependent on,
and influenced by, the very industries they regulate.”).
192 Hosmer, supra note 141, at 665.
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This gives these regulated entities a unique position of power to persuade
agencies to accede to their goals.193
In sum, de-extinction is going forward unregulated. Existing
environmental laws do not apply, and any effort to adjust these statutes
through amendments or through new legislation will likely fail. Policies
that currently govern genetic engineering have fallen victim to the
dysfunctions of a regulatory commons—”political disincentives,
fragmented authority, and agency reliance on the bioindustries stymie
regulatory expansion”—while the possibility of preemption “leaves
states with minimal regulatory discretion” to fill the gap.194 As a result, a
strong public interest in regulating biotechnology industries, including
genetic engineering, has not been realized. Needless to say, this situation
has spillover consequences for the regulation of de-extinction.
III. A HAIL MARY PASS–NORM-ENFORCED PRIVATE GOVERNANCE
MIGHT FILL THE GAP AND CIRCUMVENT THE REGULATORY COMMONS
Legal scholars, politicians, professors, and law students rarely claim
that the law evolves quickly in response to new technology. Science, on
the other hand, moves at breakneck paces that are substantially faster than
the regulatory bodies that govern it. This leaves such governing bodies at
a great disadvantage while many scientists are confined mostly by the
ethics imposed upon them by their own profession.195
This is exactly the situation facing de-extinction. The process of
creating de-extinct animals using genetic engineering is moving forward
rapidly. It is only a matter of time before the first genetically engineered
de-extinct species is created, at which point its release into the
environment is foreordained. It should be clear by now that there is no
existing legal framework within which these activities will take place,
and there is little hope that one can be created in time to manage these
events. However, as discussed in this Part, a combination of private
governance and social norms might fill the regulatory gap created by the
existence of a regulatory commons and a lack of applicable laws,
sidestepping completely the ineffectual Coordinated Framework.
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Id.
Id. at 651.
Rodriguez, supra note 23, at 586.
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A. Private Governance
Private governance occurs when private parties implement policies
designed to achieve traditional governmental goals.196 Although
government agencies can promote or discourage the development and
enforcement of private policies, they are unable to participate in creating
or implementing these policies and thus have little control over
outcomes.197 Private governance can include having non-governmental
entities set, implement, and enforce standards.198 Privately set standards
can induce a business or an individual to meet a traditional governmental
objective—like creating and protecting a public good—or to fulfill a
traditional governmental function—like monitoring or enforcing private
action.199 While “private environmental governance is not a substitute for
public governance[,] . . . it can fill temporal or other gaps in the public
governance response to environmental issues.”200
Private governance can emerge for a number of reasons. For example,
it can arise in response to the government’s complete failure to act or its
failure to act in a timely and effective manner.201 This may be due to the
presence of jurisdictional gaps, agency capture, or stress from a lack of
funding.202 At least the first two explanations appear to apply here. Gaps
in timing can occur when the government’s response to an identified
problem is too slow, or where the government’s response requires “time
to generate and enforce public measures,”203 either of which may be
applicable to de-extinction non-regulation.
Private governance frequently fills gaps in or supplements public
governance. As a result, private governance measures may “succeed

196 Vandenbergh, supra note 3, at 147 (“[P]rivate environmental governance is the development
and enforcement by private parties of requirements designed to achieve traditionally governmental
ends.”).
197 Id. (“Instead, private parties overcome collective action barriers or bypass the need for
collective action altogether to achieve environmental protection.”).
198 Id. at 146.
199 Id.; see also Michael P. Vandenbergh & Ben Raker, Private Governance and the New
Private Advocacy, 32 NAT. RES. & ENVT. J. 45, 46 (2017) (describing the various functions private
governance can perform).
200 Vandenbergh, supra note 3, at 163. The existence of an open commons may also inhibit the
government from acting or conversely, when “the regulatory space is so crowded that a regulatory
anti-commons problem exists,” creating a situation with no regulatory or management controls—
however, neither of these situations are relevant here. Id. at 161-62. Also, not relevant here is when
private governance can complement public governance by “offering incentives for higher
performance . . . or [by] supplementing existing enforcement.” Id. at 162. The almost complete
absence of public governance means it cannot serve as a baseline for higher performance.
201 Id. at 161.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 162.
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without solving the problem or being the optimal solution.”204 But even
though private governance measures often present a suboptimal or
incomplete solution, they still “may be part of an optimal mix of public
and private measures.”205 The only relevant question for determining
whether a private governance measure has succeeded is “whether the
change from what would have happened in the absence of the private
governance measure is worth the cost[,]” not whether a particular metric
of environmental improvement has been achieved.206
Here, where nothing is happening and nothing is likely to happen in
the future, to the extent private governance measures may reduce the risk
of harm to the environment and public welfare, their employment would
seem to be worth whatever costs that may occur. Even if business entities
participate in private government activities with the goal of undermining
initiatives to impose more stringent government measures,207 these
measures may be the only way to place any controls on the de-extinction
process, and perhaps business participants may be coopted by the process.
“Private governance measures often are under consideration because
ideal options are not viable.”208 This is the case with de-extinction. Private
governance has some benefits when there is no public governance.
According to Michael Vandenbergh, private governance can show the
feasibility of a public program, build a constituency to support future
government action, or lower the cost to private firms of eventual
government action because such firms may have helped shape or may
already have started to conform to privately set standards. 209 By inducing
action, private initiatives may also reduce the cost of public initiatives by
inviting private entities to take on some of the public governance
functions.210 Private actors may persuade businesses to support public or
private regulatory programs,211 and this support can “strengthen public
measures, making it more likely that they will withstand challenges” in
the future.212 Additionally, since there are no current governmental
programs available to control de-extinction, private initiatives may be a
204 Id. at 185. This avoids both the good and the bad of many private governance initiatives to
the extent that they can “undermine, enhance, delay, accelerate, or complement government action
in situations where government can act.” Id. at 186.
205 Id. at 186.
206 Vandenbergh, supra note 3, at 186.
207 Id. at 162.
208 Id. at 186; see also id. (“Another important factor in assessing the success of private
governance actions is the effect of a private governance option on existing governance measures
and on the likelihood of adopting other public or private governance options.”).
209 Id. at 187.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Vandenbergh, supra note 3, at 188.
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way of experimenting with different approaches to the problem at “low
risk” and low cost to the government,213 improving the likelihood of
future government action if the approaches gain some traction.
Private governance can work where the participants have “adequate
information, iterative relationships, opportunities for social sanctions[]
and rewards, and when there is limited pressure on the resource.” 214 These
factors are present more often in small groups than in large
organizations.215 Although de-extinction will likely have a global impact,
its initial influence will be limited to the species’ local release sites, and
only a few scientists or companies will be involved. Thus, de-extinction
likely will meet the small group criteria. The participants in de-extinction
will be limited to scientists and genetic engineering companies
possessing the relevant information, and this small number of actors
should enable reiterative experiences as well as opportunities for
sanctions and rewards. Unfortunately, since so little is known about how
de-extinct species will behave outside of a laboratory, the amount of
pressure these species will place on specific local environments is
unknown.216 This could create a problem for private governance, as the
problems may be too big to control other than through public governance
means.
Typical private governance measures, such as labeling, make little
sense in the case of de-extinction because, in most situations, there will
be no product for sale.217 Nonetheless, private governance can involve
“private behavior that often has the effect of or is motivated by the desire
to manage a common pool resource, provide a public good, or reduce a
negative externality.”218 Here, the public good would be facilitating deextinction while reducing the negative externalities of environmental and
public harm.

Id.
Id. at 164.
215 Id. (citing Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 382–83 (1997) (noting that small groups are not necessary for norm influence
if adequate information and opportunities for social sanctions exist)); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social
Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 359, 359–60, 365 (2003)
(distinguishing group size and relationship among group members).
216 See supra Part I.B.1.a (discussing how little is known about the potential impact of
resurrected species on the environment and the resultant risks).
217 Vandenbergh, supra note 3, at 167 (“To the extent environmental protection is in a
consumer’s preference set, labeling systems provide the information about the provenance and
performance of the good necessary to enable the consumer to act on the preference.”); see also
Hosmer, supra note 141, at 669 (“In order to preserve these markets, GM crop manufacturers have
an interest in ensuring government-prescribed food safety measures and have engaged in voluntary
labeling for exports.”).
218 Vandenbergh, supra note 3, at 182.
213
214
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When business entities participate in private governance measures to
control their activities, public trust in these businesses will increase.
Conversely, when corporations weaken accountability procedures, they
have more difficulty defending against claims that their interests are
adverse to those of the public.219 Or, put another way, “[w]ithout
mechanisms to ensure responsibility, the industry cannot effectively
claim to be responsible. Without trust markets corrode.”220 This is
especially true of the chemical industry, which includes genetic
engineers, and which depends on “public trust and support in its
institutional and societal justiﬁcation and performance.” 221 It is also the
responsibility of members of that industry “‘to create trust through a high
degree of credibility and reliability as experts when it comes to (public)
discourses on risks and beneﬁts of science and technology or the ethical
and social implications of scientiﬁc and technological progress.’”222
Because so much is unknown when it comes to de-extinction, trust will
be at a premium.
The Asilomar Guidelines (“Guidelines”) are an example of private
governance in the field of genetic engineering. Formulated by a group of
concerned biotechnology scientists who met in Asilomar, California, in
1975, the Guidelines were norms and standards for conducting research
that are grounded in the “precautionary principle”—”a research policy
that calls for higher safety standards for experiments that could
potentially cause irreparable environmental or health harms.”223 The
Guidelines’ strict laboratory procedures were designed to contain and
prevent any unintended release of GMOs into the environment.224 Later,
they formed “the basis of the [National Institutes of Health]’s guidelines
for government-funded rDNA research.”225 Even though the Guidelines
applied only to government-financed research, many scientists
voluntarily acceded to them out of a fear of negative publicity.226 One
may assume that the Guidelines had the intended effect of quieting public
anxiety about genetic engineering, since such activity is proceeding in an

219 Rick Reibstein, A more ethical chemistry, 8 GREEN & SUSTAINABLE CHEMISTRY 36, 37
(2017) (“When too much money, advertising, legal expertise and lobbying is evident, distrust of
the entity that seeks a dominating inﬂuence is inevitable.”).
220 Id. at 36.
221 Id. at 37.
222 Id. (quoting Jan Mehlich et al., The ethical and social dimensions of chemistry: reflections,
considerations, and clarification, 23 CHEM. EUR. J. 1210, 1216 (2017).
223 Hosmer, supra note 141, at 655.
224 Id.; SHELDON KRIMSKY, BIOTECHNICS & SOCIETY: THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL GENETICS 14,
100-01 (1991).
225 Hosmer, supra note 141, at 655.
226 Id.
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era of public transparency under the 2017 Update to the Coordinated
Framework.227
While private governance measures have public utility to the extent
that they can fill a gap in regulation and may lead eventually to more
effective and inclusive public regulation, they also run the risk of
undermining those efforts as less rigorous alternatives. Since this article
has suggested the low likelihood that any public regulations will emerge
in time to control de-extinction, it is important to impose some controls
on that process soon. Private governance offers controls on an interim
basis. However, since there will only be a very limited market for deextinct species and thus no market-based incentives at play, what will
encourage scientists to self-regulate and engage in such socially positive,
outward-looking behavior? This article suggests that the encouragement
rests in social norms.
B. Social Norms
Norms can be informal obligations or social rules that do not depend
on government for their creation or enforcement.228 They can be
explanatory or aspirational, as they depict how people behave and can
also suggest what people should do to conform to community
expectations.229 Any obligation people feel to conform their behavior to a
communally accepted norm is independent of the government telling
them how to behave and is reinforced by abstract norms, like the personal
responsibility norm.230 Martha Nussbaum believes that “a suitably
flexible and realistic normative theory is actually very valuable, as a road
map that will help us move toward our destination.”231 That destination
here would be controlling risky behavior by scientists and companies
engaged in de-extinction, and any road map of how to get there would be
227 See Modernizing the Regulatory System for Biotechnology Products: Final Version of the
2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, Exec. Office of
the President (Jan. 4, 2017).
228 Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 5, at 134.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 142.
231 Martha C. Nussbaum, Climate Change: Why Theories of Justice Matter, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L.,
469, 486 (2013); see also Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Contractual Obligations
Created Equal?, 100 GEO. L.J. 5, 16 (2011) (“On the one hand, rational-choice theory suggests that
promisors behave in a purely selfish manner to further their own goals. On the other hand, an array
of alternative theories [moral obligation, motivated reasoning, and social norms] argue that the
motivation for performance is far richer and more complex and is driven by a range of internal and
external forces.”). For a rich description of how contract performance decisions are not motivated
“solely by monetary incentives,” but “reflect a far more complex decision-making process. Forces
such as moral obligations, motivated reasoning, and social norms affect people’s perception of their
contractual obligations and the way in they are expected to behave,” see also id. at 48-49.
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helpful. With those thoughts in mind, this article discusses how norms
might operate in a system of private governance to encourage judicious
behavior by the scientific community with regard to de-extinction.
Social norms “reflect ‘widely held beliefs about social obligations with
respect to which noncompliance may trigger external social
sanctions,’”232 like shaming or loss of reputation. Because social norms
“embody general expectations about public behavior,” they are
responsive to “more external forms of enforcement like gossip, shaming,
and even exclusion from the community.”233 This makes their
enforcement easy and inexpensive because there is very little cost
associated with negative gossip or expressions of admiration about a
person’s conduct.234 Thus, there is no need for private enforcement
organizations to develop, monitor or enforce these norms. There are no
legal remedies for norm violations that are not codified in statutes or
implicit in the common law, which makes sense given that norms are
enforced through the application of nonlegal sanctions to violators.235
The positive reward for an individual complying with a social norm is
an improved reputation in the community.236 Businesses care about their
reputations, especially since advocacy groups can mobilize public
opposition quickly if a business’s reputation is negative.237 Because
norms are not dependent on the government for their existence or
implementation, they “provide a private, decentralized, and competitive
alternative to government control of social behavior.”238 Ann Carlson
suggests that norms work best “when social problems arise in small,
homogeneous groups of individuals who experience some personal
benefit from complying with the norm and where there are no viable
regulatory tools to address the problem.”239 Both these circumstances may
be present in the case of resurrecting extinct species, as there are no
regulatory tools to address the problem and the community of scientists
working on de-extinction is still small.240
Environmental protection is a “general, widely held abstract norm.”241
There is also an “abstract ‘personal responsibility norm,’ summarized in
232 Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 5, at 135 (quoting Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: R A Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate
Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 69 (2003)).
233 Id. at 135-36.
234 Id. at 136.
235 Feldman & Teichman, supra note 231, at 15.
236 Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 5, at 136.
237 Vandenbergh, supra note 3, at 168-89.
238 Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 5, at 137.
239 Id. (citing Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1233-34 (2001)).
240 See supra Part II.A.
241 Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 5, at 136.
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the euphemism ‘do no harm to others.’”242 Since a norm is a reflection of
a community’s belief, an individual’s community—or society more
broadly—defines the “appropriate behavior” that generates a norm.243
Both norms are relevant to the behavior of companies and individuals
involved in the de-extinction process. However, since no laws currently
govern de-extinction, the norm of law compliance—another powerful,
widely held abstract norm—does not come into play.244 However, law
compliance and its internalization by individuals245 illustrates how a
personal abstract norm can become “a moral inhibition, often reinforced
by a sense of personal shame when the prohibited act is actually engaged
in.”246 This reaction is what one would expect with the triggering of the
environmental protection and personal responsibility norms.
Norms work to the extent that they are internalized by the relevant
community. Here, the relevant community is comprised of scientists and
genetic engineering firms working on de-extinction projects.247 Norms
can help influence behavior when there is “some communal consensus
about the validity of the norm, and people also believe that actions
inconsistent with the norm might harm others or harm something of value
to them.”248 Assuming that affected individuals engaged in de-extinction
value biological diversity and environmental integrity, and assuming that
these actors can visualize a connection between the development of
resurrected species and harm to those environmental values, then the
norms of environmental protection and personal responsibility may take
root and influence behavior.
Norms can change or direct behavior when the norm violator feels
“guilt and remorse”; these feelings should affect behavior automatically
without outside prompting and should not be dependent on discovery by
others.249 In order for a norm violator’s behavior to influence that of other

Id. at 136-37.
Id.; see also Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach for Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1665 (1996) (opining
that for a social norm to influence individual behavior, the individual’s community must have
internalized it).
244 Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 5, at 136.
245 Id. (“One of the things that motivates people to be law-abiding is ‘internalization of legal
norms or moral commitment to comply with the law’” (quoting Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond
Elegance: R A Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 68 (2003))).
246 Id.
247 Feldman & Teichman, supra note 231, at 15 (citing Robert Cooter, Normative Failure of
Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 958-68 (1997)); Richard D. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997).
248 Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 5, at 142.
249 Feldman & Teichman, supra note 231, 15-16.
242
243
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actors, the community must publish information about the norm violation
and sanction the violator through shaming.250
People are more likely to internalize norms and to change their
behavior if violations of norms are sanctioned.251 Shaming a norm
violator is a common sanction for norm violations.252 Shame can create a
sufficiently unpleasant experience for the norm offender, as well as for
potential offenders, that the offense is unlikely to be repeated.253 Shaming
can also be used for company officials.254 However, sometimes shaming
can “backfire” when an individual’s reduced status in their community
and public humiliation lessens the desire to stop the offending behavior
because there is nothing else to lose.255 Additionally, if shaming sanctions
are used too frequently, the public will lose interest in them, lessening
their deterrent effect.256
There must be a “common understanding that an offender’s
irresponsible environmental behavior is bad,” and until that
understanding emerges, shame fails as a sanction.257 Here, the
environmental and public health risks associated with de-extinction
should be commonly understood by those working on it. And while
“shaming works best in ‘relatively bounded, close-knit communities
whose members ‘don’t mind their own business’ and who rely on each
other,”258 the places in which de-extinction scientists and others work
create those bounded and close-knit circumstances.259 These communities
are likely to share information about the risks of resurrecting extinct
species. They are also dependent on the risk-averse behavior of others to
create an atmosphere of public trust enabling their own work. This

Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 5, at 159-60.
Id. at 165.
252 Id. at 160-61.
253 Id.
254 Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CA. L. REV. 959,
968 (1999) (“High status business leaders may be especially susceptible to shaming rituals. ‘They
are the people most likely to worry about public appearances, to be vulnerable to moralistic or
judgmental social groups, to defer to authority and to be relative conventional in attitudes toward
‘law and order.’’ They are also the people most likely to be concerned about maintaining the
appearance of business competence and professional accomplishment. Also, because they regard
themselves as participants in a ‘culture of honor,’ they are especially sensitive to the opinions of
peers” (quoting Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1880, 1934 (1991))).
255 Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 5, at 163.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 164.
258 Id. at 163.
259 Similarly, while education can change behavior, one must assume that the participants in the
de-extinction field are well aware of both the benefits and costs of de-extinction.
250
251
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workplace pressure and the threat of shame may make these actors avoid
risky behavior.260
The public, particularly environmental advocates, concerned
scientists, and religious figures, must persuade participants in the deextinction process to agree to self-regulate their behavior. Public
education motivating people to put pressure on individuals whose
behavior is publicly perceived to be counter-productive can be an
effective tool. This is true even though “people use a variety of heuristics
to process and internalize information, especially information about risk,
which may distort the information’s accuracy.”261
The effectiveness of information strategies for changing behavior
depends in large part on the degree to which the public can understand
and act on information about the risks posed by questionable behavior
and the degree to which the public values the environment—in other
words, how much the public has been environmentally “socialized.”262
However, the problem with trying to educate people about environmental
risks is that the information about those risks may be “contentious,
complex, contestable, and frequently from non-credible sources.”263
Additionally, “[t]he sheer complexity and volume of often conflicting
information about environmental harms makes it extremely difficult to
convey the magnitude of a particular environmental risk.”264 Too much
information, which is not uncommon in the environmental area, can be
overwhelming to the lay public and can cause people to “tune out.”265
Professor Cass Sunstein recommends the use of norm entrepreneurs266 to
help the public understand risk information. Norm entrepreneurs focus
interest by constructing “cognitive frames” to help interpret and
dramatize issues; if successful, “the new frames resonate with broader
public understandings and are adopted as new ways of talking about and
understanding issues.”267 Indeed, the principal task of norm entrepreneurs
is persuasion.268
260 See Vandenbergh & Raker, supra note 199, at 47 (discussing the increased importance of
reputation and the social license to operate in a private governance regime).
261 Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 5, at 166.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 168.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Sunstein, supra note 7, at 909 (defining “norm entrepreneurs” as “people interested in
changing social norms,” who when successful, produce “norm bandwagons,” which are created
when small changes in behavior result in large ones, and “norm cascades,” which happen when
there are “rapid shifts in norms.”).
267 Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 5, at 144.
268 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,
52 INT’L ORG. 887, 914 (1998).
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In the case of risks from de-extinction, environmental and public
health advocates, religious leaders, and concerned scientists—to name
just a few—might serve as these entrepreneurs and publicize the concerns
about de-extinction, helping people understand the risks and costs of deextinction and turning them into advocates for safe action. To the extent
that motivating public action is inherent in any norm enforcement
approach, as is suggested here, then motivational information must arrive
when and where a decision is about to be made. This information must
be linked to the available choices and delivered personally from trusted
sources.269 Norm entrepreneurs can serve as those trusted sources.
Market-based incentives such as tax relief and subsidies, or
disincentives like fees or taxes, are often proffered as ways to induce
desired behavior by the targeted industry.270 Any of these might be viable
with respect to participants in the de-extinction industry.
Current regulatory conditions surrounding de-extinction are conducive
to the emergence of private governance. Private governance can fill the
regulatory gap and end—at least temporarily—the current regulatory
commons problem that de-extinction efforts face. However, in order to
assure that self-regulation arises in the field of de-extinction, there must
be a possibility of reputational injury for bad behavior and rewards for
good behavior. Certain well-established, widely-approved norms, like
those underpinning environmental protection and civic responsibility,
might assist in the effort. For reasons that are similar to those favoring
self or private governance, such norms might arise and help guide more
prudent behavior by those seeking to resurrect extinct species, even in the
absence of market inducements.
CONCLUSION
Scientists probably will soon be able to bring back extinct species.
Whether for the thrill of seeing de-extinct species roaming the Earth
again, for commercial gain, or for an array of potentially beneficial
scientific and moral reasons, resurrected species will be created in
laboratories through genetic engineering. It is then only a matter of time
before these species are placed back into the wild. However, there are no
laws or policies currently on the books that can be used to adequately
protect these species, the environment, or the public from potential harm.
On the one hand, existing laws do not apply, and it is highly unlikely that
they will be modified in time to respond. On the other hand, the field of
genetic engineering has all the dysfunctional properties of a regulatory
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commons with no clear decisional center or dominant policy. The
problem is that in this regulatory vacuum, the potential for harm to the
environment, public welfare, and even to the de-extinct species
themselves is high.
Commentators have noted that when private governance emerges, it
“often occurs in areas where public preferences for environmental
protection are widespread but government has not acted at all or a gap
remains.”271 This is the situation facing participants in the de-extinction
field. It is in the public interest for participants in this field to self-regulate
in order to avoid disasters and preserve their reputations. But a vague idea
of the public interest may not be enough to inspire these actors to
cooperate. Thus, this article proposes that the public—educated and
energized by environmental and public health advocates, members of
religious communities, and even by concerned scientists—might enforce
well known social norms, like environmental protection and personal
responsibility, to encourage self-regulation. The invocation of norms that
are familiar and frequently enforced can be an effective and inexpensive
way to encourage positive, conscientious behavior by potential
transgressors without government involvement.
If de-extinction is to happen, which appears more likely than not, the
safest course would be to wait until there is an effective, viable federal
regulatory framework to assure environmental protection and human
safety. The best course would be to avoid these experiments in general
and to focus instead on protecting existing endangered species and
preventing their extinction. But that quagga272 has left the barn, and selfregulation offers a way forward that may actually encourage and
foreshadow public regulation.
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